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Abstract
In this article I discuss how false memories do not always have to be associated with negative
outcomes.  Indeed, under some circumstances, memory illusions, like other illusions more
generally, can have positive consequences.  These consequences are discussed in the context of
the adaptive function of memory, including how false memories can have fitness-relevant benefits
on subsequent behavior and problem solving.  It is also hoped that this article changes how
illusions are conceptualized, especially those arising from memory.  Rather than being a “demon”
that vexes our theories of memory, illusions can be thought of as sometimes having positive
consequences much in the same way as many of the other outputs of a very powerful, adaptive
memory system.
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The Adaptive Nature of Memory and Its Illusions
False memories, or memories for part or all of an experience that did not actually occur,
are one consequence of a powerful and adaptive memory system that is reconstructive.  Although
much of today’s research on memory illusions focuses on their negative consequences (e.g., such
as those seen in the forensic arena), some recent research has convincingly demonstrated that false
memories can have positive consequences.  These more positive consequences occur not only in
terms of other cognitive processes (reasoning, problem solving) (e.g., Howe, Garner,
Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011), but also influence future behavior (Chen, Zeltzer, Craske, & Katz,
1999), as well as guide planning for future actions, perhaps the quintessential adaptive function
associated with memory (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  In this
article, the adaptive nature of memory, both true and false, is articulated using a variety of recent
studies including those showing that processing information for its relevance to survival can lead
to improvements in remembering, both in adults (for a review, see Nairne, 2010) and children
(Otgaar & Smeets, 2010).   Surprisingly, such processing also leads to increased false memory
rates, resulting in a net decrease in overall accuracy (Howe & Derbish, 2010).  It is this latter
discovery that has led to a new, adaptive perspective on memory illusions, one that parallels other
discoveries concerning the adaptive value of perceptual and cognitive illusions more generally
(McKay & Dennett, 2009).
Adaptive Memory
            It is, perhaps, self-evident that memory is one adaptive system that has emerged given a
variety of evolutionary pressures.  It is not known exactly when, or under what adaptive pressures,
individual memory became an essential evolutionary adaptation.  Speculation suggests that it may
have emerged some 500 million years ago (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010).  This “Cambrian
explosion” and its attendant advance in memory marked a critical change in the number and
variety of fitness-relevant behaviors available to the organism.  These advances included memory
for locations where survival-essential items could be found (e.g., food and water), shaped the
manner in which organisms searched for mating partners, and helped them recognize and avoid
predators (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010).  Memory is essential to many survival-relevant behaviors,
especially learning associations between significant objects (e.g., predators) and signs of their
presence (e.g., odors, rustling grass).  The evolution of memory, particularly associative memory
where past experiences can be retained, opened up hitherto unseen mechanisms for adaptive
change including the ability to mentally simulate possible future states when deciding the best
course of action given multiple alternatives (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).
Research has shown that the neural mechanisms underlying recall of past episodes also
underlie imagining future behaviors, although the source of this similarity remains unclear
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  Recent evidence has shown the important role that dopamine plays
in remembering previous experiences, linking current information to those memories, and
utilizing these associations in the service of future, adaptive behaviors.  That is, “… when
individuals encounter new information that evokes old associations, this associative novelty can
promote not only preferential encoding but also the organization of memory to facilitate its later
use – processes that could be catalyzed by dopamine” (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010, p. 468). Thus,
there is compelling behavioral and neuroscientific evidence supporting the idea that memory has
been shaped by evolution with adaptation in mind.
            Additional behavioral evidence comes from two distinct lines of research concerning how
evolution may have affected memory.  First, memory may have become specialized to perform
very particular functions, including recognition of trustworthiness that may enhance survival by
avoiding individuals who are deceptive (e.g., Mehl & Buchner, 2008).  Others suggest that
memory was shaped by gender differences in the division of labor, where spatial memory
requirements were different for men who hunted mobile prey than women who gathered food
from fixed and immobile locations (Pacheco-Cobos, Rosetti, Cuatianquiz, & Hudson, 2010).
            Second, research has examined whether memory is specialized to retain fitness-relevant,
survival information (Nairne, 2010).  Here, participants are given an ancestrally relevant (e.g.,
surviving in the grasslands) or irrelevant (e.g., surviving in a city) scenario and are asked to
evaluate the importance of a list of words in the context of these environments.  Concepts rated
for ancestrally relevant survival are remembered better on a surprise memory test.
            Although there is disagreement concerning the importance of an evolutionary
interpretation of these findings, another problem has emerged; that is, not only are there more true
memories generated in this adaptive memory procedure, but also more false memories.  Using
lists of highly associated concepts that were survival-relevant, negatively valenced, or neutral, true
and false memories were more abundant when items were rated for survival.  Independent of
processing, survival-relevant concepts also evinced higher rates of true and false recollection
(Howe & Derbish, 2010).
Together, these results raise several concerns, not the least of which is that “adaptive
memory” results in reduced, not enhanced, accuracy.  Because false memories increase at a rate
commensurate with true memories for survival materials and survival processing, overall
recollective accuracy necessarily decreases relative to other types of materials and processing.
Therefore, we can ask why correlated increases in both true and false memories are adaptive?
Moreover, what possible adaptive significance would there be for constructing either entirely, or
even just partially, false memories?  This is important because depending on their context, false
memories may have negative (e.g., the conviction of innocent people) rather than positive (e.g.,
evading predators) consequences.  Before answering these questions, I turn to a more general
problem, namely, what is the adaptive value of illusions more generally?
Do Some Illusions have Adaptive Consequences?
            Illusions of various origins occur more frequently than we think.  Indeed, research in the
visual sciences has shown that much of what we “see” is actually a type of “intelligent”
hallucination (Gregory, 1968).  In fact, perceptual illusions are critical to adaptation because in
many natural environments, the type and amount of sensory information available can vary over
time and across space.  For example, “it is important to be able to perceive surfaces independently
of their varying light intensity (and vice versa) in order to forage or predate successfully” (Corney
& Lotto, 2007, p. 1790).  That illusions occur is a simple consequence of the constructive nature
of perception; “every instrument has measurement errors and the human visual system is no
exception.  So every percept will have an error associated with it, be it large or small” (Corney &
Lotto, 2007, p. 1797).
Magicians have long exploited frailties of our visual system by creating optical illusions
involving mirrors, lighting, and variation in object perspective.  Cognitive illusions also abound
and are similarly manipulated by magicians who use sleight of hand.  The key here is to create a
“false” action (e.g., pretending to move an object from one hand to another) that makes the
audience think they are seeing a “real” action.  Indeed, audiences frequently report “seeing” and
“remembering” the “real” event even though it never happened (for a review, see Kuhn, Amlani,
& Rensink, 2008).  Although these illusions are not necessarily adaptive (unless you are
attempting to survive by being a magician), they are based on principles derived from basic
mechanisms that are quite adaptive.
Although the systems that create illusions are themselves shaped by evolution, whether the
illusions themselves are adaptive depends on the nature of the illusion and the context in which it
occurs.  Indeed, as already noted in the case of memory illusions, not all errors have adaptive
consequences.  Although not all cognitive errors are adaptive (e.g., the Cotard delusion where
people come to believe that they are dead despite being alive), there are many that have fitness
relevance (McKay & Dennett, 2009).  For example, positive yet illusion-like self-appraisals can
lead to a sense of confidence, leading to better chances of success in future tasks.  Moreover,
illusion-like beliefs can impact health.  For example, individuals’ beliefs that the medicine they
are taking can, and then does, cure what is ailing them occurs frequently despite that “medicine”
being a placebo.
Do Some Memory Illusions have Adaptive Consequences?
            Little doubt exists that memory is a powerful and flexible system that is essential to an
organism’s ability to adapt and survive.  Representational flexibility is key to an organism’s
ability to restructure and update what is in memory, a critical feature linked to its survival,
processes that are accomplished by combining, rewriting, and blending incoming information
with information already in memory.  However, because memory is so malleable, remembering is
a process that, like the other perceptual and cognitive processes, is prone to error and, under some
circumstances, can go inexorably wrong.
But just how wrong can remembering be?  At one end of the spectrum, we may make
memory errors concerning less consequential aspects of our experiences, perhaps confusing two
similar experiences (e.g., whether we wore a black or blue suit to work yesterday) or by inferring
that events occurred because they are consistent with world knowledge (e.g., inferring, but not
explicitly remembering, that we locked the door before leaving for work).  At the other end of the
spectrum, people falsely remember entire events occurring when no such event has taken place
(e.g., being abducted by a UFO) (Spanos, 1996).
Although we know a considerable amount about the “darker” side of memory illusions (as
when people falsely remember being sexually abused), we know much less about the positive and
potentially adaptive functions associated with memory illusions.  Recently, we (Howe & Derbish,
2010; Howe et al., 2011) have argued that false memories, like false beliefs, can (depending on
their content and context) have an adaptive consequence.  For example, one adaptive value of
false autobiographical recollection is the tendency toward positive biasing of our past self.  These
“misrememberings” involve false memories about the self rather than the event, and allows
revision of the past that facilitates self-enhancement, permits a more positive self-evaluation of
one’s current self, and helps maintain effective social relations (Ross & Wilson, 2003).  This
positivity has also been linked to enhanced emotional regulation (Mather & Cartensen, 2005) that,
in turn, has been interpreted as being an extremely adaptive function of memory, or more
accurately, of false remembering (Newman & Lindsay, 2009).  This is because such recollections
can directly benefit one’s current self-image and influence future behaviors and motivations.
Indeed, because many functions of autobiographical memory are arguably social, false memories
of our past may: (a) be quite adaptive inasmuch as they serve to enhance social relationships and
(b) serve to enhance intimacy in relationships, a goal more important than keeping an accurate
record of one’s past.
False memories may have other adaptive uses, including aiding the solution to problems in
a survival-related context, something that may be a crucial evolutionary trait.  An increase in false
memories for survival information may not necessarily be maladaptive if they can prime solutions
to complex problems in a manner similar to true memories.  As Howe and Derbish (2010) pointed
out, that the byproduct of memory activation can be a false recollection may be a small price to
pay if such false memories, like true memories, can aid the solution of more complex, survival-
relevant problems.
As a first approximation to the study of false memories and problem solving, Howe et al.
(2011) presented children and adults with lists of associated words that gave rise to false
memories.  These false memories were also the solution to compound remote associate problems,
problems that were presented after participants studied the word lists.  For those participants who
generated a false memory following list presentation, subsequent problem solving was not only
easier (higher success rates), but was also faster.  Thus, false memories generated by participants’
primed solutions in a later problem-solving task, much in the same way true memories prime
solutions on other, related tasks.
Conclusions and Future Directions
            Perception, cognition, and memory are all powerful adaptive systems that are prone to
errors (illusions) given their (re)constructive nature.  Illusions are not always detrimental and
many have more positive, fitness-relevant consequences.  Indeed, false memories not only allow
us to (mis)remember a past that facilitates the present (e.g., maintain intimate relationships), but
also helps us predict the future (e.g., avoid predators).
            As intriguing as these ideas may be, it is only by testing specific experimental predictions
about the fitness-relevant consequences of remembering that our understanding of the adaptive
function of memory (true and false) will grow (see Nairne, 2010).  Indeed, some researchers have
tested exact predictions concerning the adaptive value of false remembering, including specific
behavioral consequences that are linked to developing false memories.  For example, children
who came to falsely remember prior lumbar punctures as less painful than they actually were
experienced less distress during subsequent lumbar punctures (Chen et al., 1999).  Therefore,
reframing memories of the past can have fitness relevant consequences including making life
saving treatments not only more bearable, but also more likely to continue.  Additional research
might focus on how episodic memory errors (and accuracies) contribute to the emergence and
development of future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2005) including how memory for experiences
and solutions to past problems are used to alter future behaviors and solutions to new problems
(Suddendorf, Nielson, & von Gehlen, 2011).
            Although considerable research remains ahead of us, false memories can have positive
consequences, not just negative ones.  Determining the adaptive benefits of false memories, like
those for true memories, requires innovative experimental design, the measurement of behavioral
changes, and the assessment of the fitness-relevant consequences of such memory illusions,
immediately as well as in the future.  In this article, I have attempted to demonstrate that false,
like accurate, remembering does influence current as well as later behaviors and may even
influence the construction of plans for the future.  This is critical because it illustrates the
powerful influence memory has on behavior regardless of its truth-value.  Whether that behavior
has positive (e.g., potentially increasing the likelihood of life-saving medical treatment) or
negative (e.g., false accusations of sexual abuse leading to imprisonment of innocent people)
consequences depends on both the content of those memories as well as the context in which that
remembering occurs.  The point here is simply that while we know much about the negative
consequences of memory illusions, future research should also focus on the positive consequences
of misremembering our past.
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